In recent years there has been growing attention to the epistemology of clinical decision-making, but most studies have taken the individual physicians as the central object of analysis. In this paper we argue that knowing in current medical practice has an inherently social character and that imaging plays a mediating role in these practices. We have analyzed clinical decision-making within a medical expert team involved in diagnosis and treatment of patients with pulmonary hypertension (PH), a rare disease requiring multidisciplinary team involvement in diagnosis and management.
collaborative work relationships are likely to vary in knowledge they possess." Within this process, "physicians typically assess the adequacy of medical information on the basis of the perceived credibility of the source, whether the source is the patient or another physician" (p. 222). Through discourse, physicians assess the area and level of expertise of their coworkers and the reliability of their patient's account of his or her illness to be able to evaluate the robustness of the information provided.
Maseide
14 also characterise medical decision-making as socially distributed cognition: "A ward conference, with a number of individual members with different qualifications, functions, responsibilities, skills and experiences, has knowledge and memory structures, procedures of reasoning and practical qualifications that are socially distributed and differ from the cognitive capabilities of the individual participants."
He identifies 4 forms of evidence that "influence and regulate the judgments and decisions of medical practitioners" (p. 44): scientific evidence, evidence from personal experience, evidence as medical representation artifacts, such as images and pathology results, and "practical evidence," which is, according to Maseide, closely integrated with forms 2 and 3. This last form of evidence is cooperatively and collaboratively constructed: "practical medical evidence is generated, developed and made useful locally by medical practitioners." (p. 44) There are several seminal studies of the social aspects of decisionmaking in the tradition of distributed cognition. Cohen et al 15 , for example, considers decision-making in the context of a psychiatric ward, drawing upon a theoretical framework initially developed by
Hutchins. 16 This framework considers cognition to be distributed across individuals and artifacts, combining internal representations (in the minds of individuals) and external representations (in physical media, such as shared whiteboards). The account proposed here covers similar terrain, in that it stresses the social-or distributed-nature of knowledge processes, and the role of media, such as images. However, as will be discussed later, there are important differences between distributed cognition theory and our own. This paper's main concern is with epistemology, that is, it aims to shed light on the epistemology of clinical decision-making and also to contribute to the development of philosophical epistemologies able to cope with these kinds of contexts. The paper argues that the social nature of clinical decision-making is an ineliminable aspect of its epistemology. By this we mean that an individualist epistemology, based on a traditional analysis of knowledge in terms of individual knower,
is not adequate as a basis for an account of knowledge in clinical contexts and that sociability is a necessary aspect of the epistemology of clinical decision-making. The social character of knowledge in other spheres has been recognised by many philosophers, an early example in the turn to social knowing in scientific contexts being Hardwig 17 who writes: "Knowing, then, is often not a privileged psychological state. If it is a privileged state at all, it is a privileged social state. So,
we need an epistemological analysis of the social structure that makes the members of some teams knowers while the members of others are not." The social structures of knowledge are increasingly acknowledged in philosophical studies of scientific practice, 17- 28 proposes that the interpretation of these images depends upon the development of shared "sight styles" across radiologists in a clinic. Her account draws upon Ludwik Fleck's notion of "thought styles" and "thought collectives," stressing the social processes and the role of technologies such as software, through which people come to see in the same way. 29, 30 As will become apparent, the account we propose here is similarly oriented toward the development of shared modes of seeing.
In summary, we will argue that rather than focusing on the individ- included in this particular study for pragmatic reasons alone, as our ethical clearance did not extend to them. For this reason, the study focuses on how images are used for diagnosis, which is an aspect of the decision-making process where the division of epistemic labor falls more on the clinical team; a fuller study will also consider patients. 34 Participants in the study were all members of the clinical team and invited to contribute to the study and/or collaborate on it. The team confers weekly in a ward MDT meeting discussing the management of the current ward patients and a radiology MDT meeting where current inpatients, patients in short-stay admissions for diagnostic testing, and outpatients may be discussed. Data were collected through observing weekly MDT meetings, performing 11 qualitative semistructured interviews with members of the clinical team, and conducting a group discussion on emerging imaging technologies.
MDT meetings were not video or audio recorded as we did not have ethical clearance for this; we recorded our observations in notes. In addition, we video-recorded a session of 2 radiologists collaboratively reporting an X-ray CT scan and an interdisciplinary meeting to determine the usefulness of an emerging imaging technique. All recordings were transcribed and coded using NVIVO (QRS international Pty Ltd.
version 10, 2012) . The data used for this particular study are the semi-structured interviews, which had framed our data collection in terms of expertise, teamwork, and the role of imaging technologies.
The interviews were divided into 3 main sections: the interpretation and use of images, expertise and trust, and the introduction of new imaging modalities. The analysis of the data broadly followed these categorisations, but also looked for connections between them, using a grounded approach, that is, using the main topics and subtopics of the interviews as a first iteration, and an open coding approach, looking for relationships and groupings within and among these topics and 1 (1) Pulmonary arterial hypertension either idiopathic or associated with other conditions, (2) pulmonary hypertension (PH) due to left heart disease, (3) PH due to lung diseases and/or hypoxia, (4) chronic thromboembolic PH, and (5) PH with unclear and/or multifactorial mechanisms.
subtopics, thereby establishing recurring and contrasting motifs and themes. In particular, we looked for connections between the MDT observations and the interviews with individual research participants, as is evidenced in the discussion below. In our epistemological analysis of team decision-making in the PH
service, we will demonstrate how MDTs need to combine the individual expertise of team members to be able to fit together all relevant information that leads to a team decision and that therefore knowing in distributed.
| MDT meetings
We observed 2 types of MDT meetings: on the ward and in the radiology section. Here, we focus on the second of these. In weekly radiology meetings, the PH team of our field study reviews the imaging of all patients in the last week, admitted for diagnostic testing, or admit- MDT meetings are geared toward consensus within the full team.
In most meetings, more than one radiologist and more than one clinician are present, to have an extra pair of eyes and make sure that things are not missed, and also because a conclusion or interpretation that is shared by others is considered more reliable than when it is reached by a single person. Hence, one of the purposes of MDT meetings is to deal with uncertainty and incomplete information, which is a challenge of clinical decision-making. 3 The consensual nature of this process is one way of managing responsibility for the patient, and we would expect that distributed knowledge also leads to distributed responsibility. Hence, the process of fitting together heterogeneous sources of information into a coherent and consistent framing of a patient is a collaborative effort, and MDT meetings are an important place where information can be shared, discussed, interpreted, and adjusted, allowing the development of a collective way of seeing and a shared language. For example, after voicing the team's decision, the consultant clinician also mentions the right heart catheter measurements, which allows for a final check and last integration of all evidence and which helps radiologists to get a feel for the correlation between the imaging and right heart catheter findings. MDTs continue to play their role when clinicians or radiologists are not in a meeting, first by knowing that they are held accountable for the quality, relevance, and comprehensiveness of the information they provide at MDT meetings and second by shaping the information that is gathered in such a way that it fits the structure of the shared framework of the MDT.
In terms of epistemological responsibilities, it is interesting that these include responsibilities toward the sociability of the team. Team members have an epistemological responsibility to weigh up evidence according to their knowledge and also to open up their deliberation to others, justifying to others how they come to a certain interpretation while being sensitive to deliberations and interpretations from others.
If we take an overarching epistemological responsibility of each person to be toward a sound shared decision regarding the care of patients, an aspect of that epistemological responsibility is inherently social in character. This means that it is not an epistemological plus a social responsibility, side by side, but both at the same time. This is seen in the more detailed example of image interpretation in the next section.
| Distributed knowing in image interpretation
The structure of distributed knowing is especially clear when dealing with images. Kelly Joyce (2005) demonstrated that the use of MRI is local, embodied and contingent, for three reasons. 36 Firstly because in the production of the image parameter choices by radiographers while physically scanning a patient influence the resulting image, secondly because the interpretation and translation of the image by a moving image of the heart during the cardiac cycle (this process is called "cardiac gating"). This image sequence resembles a beating heart, and this is used to assess the function of the heart by visual assessment of chamber anatomy, contraction, and potential leaking of heart valves. The right heart function is relevant for prognosis and disease severity, while the left heart is assessed to exclude left heart disease.
In addition, images are processed to quantify predetermined parameters relevant to cardiac function, such as ejection fraction (the amount of blood pumped by the heart with each heartbeat) and calculated car- 
| The mediating role of imaging technologies
In our field study, the physicists, radiographers, and radiologists involved in PH imaging are highly specialised and have a long history of collaboration, developing methods to analyse and evaluate CMR images and metrics together. The technologies, for example, the scanner, the sequences facilitating the acquisition of CMR images, the image processing algorithms and the software tools that enable drawing the right heart ventricle contours, calculating the ejection fraction and sharing the results, play a crucial and active role in these processes. The technologies, the users, the ways of looking, and the possible knowledge claims coevolve with each other. Kelly Joyce (2006) demonstrates how MRI coevolved with ways of looking by describing its historical development. 38 MRI was originally developed as a tool to measure the composition of materials in physics and chemistry (spectroscopy) and later, driven by the "war on cancer" in the United States, attempted to be modified into a tool to measure tissue composition and ultimately into an imaging method.
The images produced by MRI were initially in full color and included an array of numbers. After being taken up by radiology, MRI scans were presented in gray scale, fitting the images radiologists were already familiar with and the existing technological constraints. In the field of PH, this coevolution is also evident. MRI, by producing a specific type or contrast, between different types of soft tissues, drives a specific kind of visualisation of the heart muscle, and the method of electrocardiogram-gating allows visualisation of movements of the heart during a complete heart cycle, enabling CMRI. Clinicians and radiologists involved in diagnosis and treatment of PH, from being familiar with heart anatomy and physiology, recognise the relevant structures (ie, septum, ventricles, and valves),
and from being familiar with what type of information is required in clinical practice, they recognise which relevant questions might possibly be answered by these types of imaging. However, they need to learn how to recognise deficiencies and how to evaluate function by relating images to clinical outcomes. Together with an ongoing and rigorous discussion, these interactions among radiographers, radiologists and clinicians, and the imaging technologies, push the development and tweaking of acquisition sequences to improve image contrast for those specific practices, and image processing and analysis algorithms to produce relevant metrics such as right heart ventricle ejection fraction.
In repeated interactions, medical teams cultivate a collection of stable, agreed upon orientations toward evidence and knowledge that provides an intersubjective framework within which claims and interpretations can be justified and decisions can be arrived at and mostly the images relating to the patient discussed are displayed and discussed; at the very least, they are always mentioned and referred to. 5 The third mediating role of images, as pervasively framing the epistemic domain, is closely related to its other two roles, but relates to the sheer scale of image use and research in the domain. MRI became routinely used in the PH unit that we studied 4 Images might also play a role in the interactions between clinicians and patients;
however, we did not study these interactions in our field work. 5 An imaging modality that plays an important role in PH diagnosis is the echocardiogram, but interestingly, this modality is hardly ever referred to, let alone displayed at multidisciplinary team meeting. This probably has to do with the fact that echocardiograms are not shared via the same patient archiving and communication system, with the user-specificity of US images and that interpretation of these images requires cardiologic expertise. Another modality that is relatively little referred to is electrocardiography. since 2004. 6 Since its introduction, even artifacts of CMR imaging have been found to be diagnostically useful, as in the case of the so-called black blood artifact, 41 and other imaging technologies and other tests become less used. The introduction and development of a new imaging technique or modality usually runs alongside and piggybacks on an existing one, as it needs both to cohere with and go beyond the existing techniques and modalities.
As we have discussed, the ability to interpret and use the images -also makes it difficult to arrive at purely external assessments of specific technological developments once they become the norm, because the process of producing the expertise to interpret them can also, paradoxically, remove the ground for making a comparison.
| DISCUSSION
The study we conducted is a small qualitative study of clinical deci- we do not invoke internal or external representations. Of course, the word "representation" is frequently used in the clinic as elsewhere in scientific contexts, but our emphasis has been on how something comes to be agreed upon as a representation, and we do not take for granted in advance that anything actually is a representation because this assumes that it is already or a priori clear how to interpret it as a representation. On our account, it is the process whereby an image's status as being a representation of some aspect of the clinical situation is established, that is at issue: as in our example, images come to represent the size of the right heart ventricle through an interactional interplay between radiologists and radiographers that foregrounds 6 The development of magnetic resonance imaging methods for PH diagnosis and classification and the impact of these are another very interesting topic, but go beyond the scope of this paper and will be discussed in other papers.
the border of this ventricle and establishes a way of drawing it, rather than this being pre-given. 7 Furthermore, our analysis implies that it is not enough to focus on the epistemological responsibilities of knowers operating as individuals, but that to be able to understand the domain better, we also need to understand how epistemological responsibilities include responsibilities toward sociability and technological mediation. In other words, epistemological responsibilities of physicians not only include the gathering, interpretation, and fitting together of evidence for each patient but also include an openness toward evidence and interpretations, and knowledge claims made on their basis by other team members, and making one's own interpretations accessible to others.
The socio-technological epistemology that we are proposing cognition that cannot be dealt with here. These are briefly differences on the status of internal representations (our account takes a phenomenological approach and bypasses these entirely); the espousal of many cognitivist accounts of a computational theory or metaphoric framework of cognition, which we do not adopt; and the view that (for example in Cunningham 2014: 187) artifacts are a subset of tools that assist people to perform cognitive functions that they could otherwise perform for themselves. 22 In the same tradition, images and visualizations have also been understood as distributed representations that aid visual thinking and communication in distributed cognitive systems. 42 On our account, artifacts, images, and visualizations are not only aids to thinking and communication, as this would take into account only the first and second mediating roles described above; rather, they have a further active mediating role in establishing a shared way of seeing as a first step to shared modes of thought. The view taken in this article is an extension of nonrepresentationalist accounts of images and models that 1 of the authors has been systematically developing in several publications, for example, Carusi (2016), Carusi and Hoel (2015) (see also further references to Carusi & Hoel publications on this topic in those articles), and Carusi (2012). 24, 43, 44 Nonrepresentationalism about perception and knowledge is not a new position, but was most significantly advanced in philosophy by the phenomenology of perception of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962; originally published in 1945) 45 ; since then it has had numerous proponents, including significant elaborations of the position in social sciences by, for example, Lynch (1988), Goodwin (1994), Goodwin (1997), Sharrock and Coulter (1998). [46] [47] [48] [49] In the tradition of cognitive sciences, it is espoused most notably by Noë (2004) . 50 
